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One of the most convincing arguments in favor of the European Monetary Union (EMU) was its being a necessary condition for the completion of the so-called 'single market'.
The retention of monetary sovereignty by individual members of the European Union (EU) allowed 'international' transaction costs to remain higher than 'domestic' ones: national markets continued to enjoy a certain degree of protection. More important still, currency devaluations, permitted within the European Monetary System (EMS), provided the political justification for innumerable discriminatory policies indirectly aimed at protecting domestic industries. In one extreme case, the devaluation of the pound and the lira in September 1992, some member governments in the EU went as far as advocating the temporary re-instatement of customs' duties on the products of Great Britain and Italy.
The expectation that the introduction of the euro, in January of 1999, would foster market unification has been only partly fulfilled. Car prices, for instance, have not converged across the EU, mostly due to captive retail national markets.
2 Nor have financial markets integrated as fast as one might have predicted. In spite of the enormous opportunities created by the advances in information and communication technology (ICT), a single European Stock Exchange, capable of competing with Wall Street, has yet to emerge, as diffuse vested interests stand in the way of uniform EU-wide legislation.
The study of past episodes of market unification is likely to provide a better understanding of the reasons for the slow emergence of a single financial market in Europe, in the wake of monetary unification. The most relevant instances of 19 th century monetary unification were those of Germany and Italy. This paper investigates the latter, discussing the pattern of financial market integration following the introduction of a 'single currency' in 1862.
After outlining the history of Italy's monetary unification (Section 1), we proceed to describe the dataset and methodology adopted to measure financial market integration (Section 2), and to depict its post-unification pattern (Section 3). The impact on market 2 See Goldberg and Verboven (2001) .
integration of a set of economic variables is examined in Section 4, while Section 5 deals with rent seeking and institutional change.
Monetary unification: a slow process.
The Italy's alliance with Prussia in the war of 1866 yielded the region of Venice, and 4 years later Italian troops entered Rome. 4 The swiftness of the nation-building process took by surprise even its main architects, Cavour in primis. In contrast with the case of Germany, Italy's unification did not slowly evolve from a zollverein: there was little market convergence prior to the event.
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In the first months of its existence, therefore, the new Parliament exerted itself in a colossal effort to unify the legal system and to create a 'customs and monetary union'.
A relic of Italy's rich and complex monetary history, 6 about 270 types of legal-tender coins circulated in the Peninsula at the time of political unification, all of different weight and metal content. 7 The decimal system did not prevail. Paper note circulation was limited. The tremendous array of exchange rates blurred the meaning of prices: high information costs discouraged arbitrage outside local commodity and financial markets.
In spite of the seemingly obvious advantages to be gained from monetary unification, the process was resisted by significant segments of the population whose voices the Mattia (1959) . 9 The transition to a new single currency can be seen as achieved when agents are endowed with the quantity they demand of the new legal tender (no rationing occurs), and they prefer to use it for their payments even though private contracts denominated in previous currencies are an available option. 10 See De Cecco (1990), Roccas (1990) ,Ripa di Meana and Sarcinelli (1990) , and Conte, Toniolo and Vecchi (2002 Sannucci (1990) 13 See Cotula and Garofano (1996) , Pittaluga (1992) , De Mattia (1959) , and Spinelli and Fratianni (1991 There are several reasons why the Rendita Italiana 5% is the financial asset most suited for an exercise in price convergence. Felloni (1964) . 17 Bianchi (1975) ; Necco (1915) ; 18 Biscaini, Cotula and Ciocca (1979) ; Della Torre (2000); Goldsmith and Zecchini (1999) ; Zamagni (1998).
Italy's outstanding debt consisted of these bonds. Bondholders included not only banks and wealthy individuals but members of the middle class as well. In the first decades after the unification, it was the only financial asset traded daily in all the bourses under investigation.
Our series cover: (i) four markets (Florence, Genoa, Milan, and Naples) for the years from 1863 to 1905, and (ii) six markets (adding Turin and Rome to the first series) for 1872 to1905. The starting dates were determined by data availability. As we find it desirable to assess market unification on the basis of a rigorously defined homogeneous (financial) commodity, our series stops in 1905, just prior to the aforementioned conversion, which introduced a 'new good'.
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Despite all the desirable properties of the Rendita Italiana that were mentioned before, the construction of the database turned out to be a painstaking exercise. To our own surprise, we found the actual content of the published prices to be extremely blurred. In fact, the difficulties met in disentangling a set of consistently-defined prices from those published by the individual Stock Exchanges turned out to be part of our explanation for the slow market-unification path. According to local customs, some of the Bourses' prices included the value of the coupon thus-far matured; others did not. In some cases listed prices assumed immediate cash payment of the bonds; in other cases the settlement was expected at the end of the month. It is impossible to say whether heterogeneous price listing practices arose from the attachment to local customs and the desire to avoid changeover costs rather than from protectionist instincts. Whatever the reasons, the long persistence of diverse price listing practices in the various Bourses blurred the information content of prices themselves for today's researchers and contemporary laymen alike. The difficulty is compounded by the lack of a single source reporting daily closing prices for all the main Bourses (see Appendix A).
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19 In any case, as shown below, by 1905, Italy's financial markets had been unified for about twenty years: the 'conversion' of 1906 and the financial crisis of 1907 begs the question of the degree of integration of the Italian with the international financial markets. As such it is the topic for a different paper. 20 In order to make prices comparable across markets we had to recover the information from a host of sources ranging from local trade journals to official publications. Appendix A provides the detail on the data sources.
Our database consists of homogenous price series for six different markets (four of them starting in1863, two in 1872), each containing weekly (Wednesday) observations. Prices correspond to ex-coupon bonds for day-end cash settlement. The data set included a small percentage of missing values that were filled in using a Kalman-filter-based procedure:
21 for each market we modelled the price time series as an ARMA (1,1) and replaced the original data with the estimated predicted values.
22
The main features of the data set are summarized in Table 1 . It has been argued that the difficulty of measuring economic integration is embarrassing, 23 as suggested by the number of alternative measures proposed, none of which is entirely satisfactory. The most popular ones are (i) the coefficient of variation of prices, and (ii) the trend of correlation between prices in the different markets over time.
We opted for the former. 21 See Harvey, (1993) . 22 Alternatively, we could have used the ARMA(1,1)-fitted values to impute missing values, and then use the filled-in series as a basis for the analysis. The two procedures turned out to give extremely similar results. For the sake of simplicity we opted for the procedure discussed in the text. 23 See Machlup (1977) . 24 We find Blyn's (1973) arguments that a higher correlation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for market integration to be pretty convincing. See also Ravallion (1986) .
the sources of data heterogeneity, we used the logarithm of prices for the Rendita Italiana. We measured the price dispersion by calculating the weekly coefficients of variation of the prices across the 4 or 6 Stock Exchanges. In order to identify the pattern of financial market unification, we calculated the yearly median CVs out of the weekly series and plotted them against time.
The pattern of financial market unification.
The pattern of financial market unification -measured by the yearly median values of weekly CVs -is shown in figure 1 . .0015
"Ocular econometrics" shows that the two series follow an almost identical pattern, indicating that our measures of market integration are quite insensitive to the changes in the composition of the series (see also Appendix B). Moreover, it should be noted that the absolute level of the coefficients of variation is much smaller, possibly by one order of magnitude, to similar measures applied to commodity and labor market prices. 25 Italy was not different from most other cases: at the time of the political unification, the market for financial assets, characterized by free capital flows and relatively cheap ICT, was far more integrated than markets constrained by tariffs and high transportation costs. Italy's financial markets seem to have reached as much integration as was allowed by the existing technology and by the preferences of (local) investors: the coefficient of variation fluctuates around a flat plateau at a very low absolute level.
The fact that in the 1870s, the Italian financial market had a long way to go before achieving unification did not escape contemporary observers. In January 1872, for instance, observers were struck to see the price of the Rendita falling by 1.5 per cent in Rome, by 2.2 per cent in Genoa and Milan, by 2.85 per cent in Naples and Florence.
Such a diverging behavior was attributed, in the language of the time, to the diversity of local 'sentiment'. Rome and Florence, it was said, took the lead from Paris. 26 The market in Naples was dominated by domestic political news while Genoese traders took into account both national and international developments.
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The influential weekly, L'Economista d'Italia, was adamant: "Those who believe that we shall soon have in Italy a leading financial center, regulating all the other ones, believe in the impossible". 28 Up to 1887, the paper drew attention to the lack of homogenous 25 See Rosenbloom (1996) , Collins (1999), and Jacks (2000) . 26 A clearly visible discontinuity in the profile of the coefficient of variation (Figure 1) identifies the year 1887 as the break-date, a conclusion not rejected by the Chow test applied to the same year. 31 In order to endogenously estimate the break-date, we also treated the date of structural change as an unknown parameter and estimated it by applying least squares methodology. 32 Figure 2 , plots the residual sum of squares resulting from the OLS estimates as a function of the break-date. The 31 Using 1887 as a break-date, the Chow statistic is 9.73, which compares with a 5 percent critical value for the F distribution equal to 3.3. 32 Bai (1994) . See also Hansen (2001) 
The driving forces of financial market integration: puzzle without an answer?
In trying to understand the driving forces shaping the pattern of price dispersion over time (figure 1), three candidates stand out as the most likely explanatory variables: (i) progress in information and communication technology, (ii) the path of monetary unification, and (iii) market size (thickness). In what follows, we test the hypothesis that the time path of market unification can be explained by factors underlined by those three variables.
The rationale of our investigation can be summarized as follows. We first model the pattern of the coefficient of variation as a piece-wise linear regression, i.e. we fit two linear regressions to the scatter of observations in Figure 1 , corresponding to the two subperiods identified by the break-date. The specified relationship is:
(1)
where D87 is a dummy variable taking the values 1 for the period before 1887 and 0 afterwards, and D87YEAR is a linear trend interacted with the dummy D87. Equation (1) was estimated by OLS, separately for the two samples corresponding to 4 and 6 Bourses respectively (see Table 2 , columns 1 and 3). Our strategy proceeds to test the explanatory We considered the following economic variables:
a) The number of telegraph offices (TELOFF). Time delays in communicating price information across markets provide an explanation for the persistence of 33 We are ruling out the case when the omitted variables happen to be orthogonal to the included variables.
inter-market price differentials. We examine the impact of the improvements in ICT on the Rendita Italiana price dispersion across the Italian bourses by considering the improvements in the domestic telegraph system as captured by the variable TELOFF. Table 2 (columns 2 and 4).
The fundamental result stems from two facts, which hold true irrespective of the number of markets considered: (i) none of the economic variables added to the base case is statistically significant, and (ii) the parameters associated with D87 and D87YEAR are remarkably stable under both models (base and augmented case). This finding implies that the presence of the economic variables in equation 2 does not improve upon the 34 See Garbade and Silber (1978) and Baia Curioni (1995). explanatory power of the base regression in equation 1, which itself does not provide any useful insight about the economic forces driving the process of market integration. A comparison between the models in columns (1) and (2) is also revealing, as the latter nests the former. In other words, the two sets of estimates together provide a formal test of the following null hypothesis: Overall, the regression results suggest that improvements in ICT, the unfolding of the effects attributable to the process of monetary unification, market size and time-related improvements in information did not significantly reduce the "ignorance in the market" 35 .
We are therefore left with a puzzle: what determined the pattern of Italy's financial market unification?
Solving the puzzle: vested interests and institutional changes.
The puzzle about the pattern of financial market unification, as described in figure 1 , is composed of three parts. (i) Why was the pace of the process so slow until 1886? (ii)
Why did a structural break occur in 1887? (iii) What explains the two major episodes of market de-integration in the 1860s and 1870s? Each of these questions requires consistent explanations that the regression analysis seems inadequate to provide. We argue that the three parts of the puzzle can be simultaneously solved by considering vested interests' efforts in sheltering local markets from outside competition, in the presence of an institutional setting that, up to the early 1880s, safeguarded the privileges of professional bodies over and above market efficiency.
Given the signs of the coefficients in decade for the financial market to achieve its own unification. The single currency was possibly a necessary, but certainly not a sufficient condition for the creation of a 'single market' in the Peninsula. The new state, on the other hand, was remarkably good at swiftly covering its territory with a thick net of telegraph stations. 37 For the reasons discussed below, however, the diffusion of information and communication technology (ICT) could not proceed beyond the Bourse's doorstep.
Whatever the reasons, ICT developments and monetary unification do not explain satisfactorily the pattern of financial market integration described in Figure 1 . In searching for an alternative, or complementary, explanation, institutional failure to check rent-seeking behavior is an obvious candidate. Revolutionary events, such as the creation of a new large sovereign state out of a host of smaller ones, generate the potential both for enormous gains and losses of income, wealth and social status. Like most other individuals, those who made a living out of the Stock Exchanges believed that competition was good for every trade but their own. They had carved for themselves comfortable niches in the protected economies of the pre-unification states and were not prepared to give them up. As no leading Exchange existed capable of exploiting economies of scale in order to acquire business at the expense of the smaller exchanges, no countervailing lobby emerged to contrast that of local protectionist interest. Italy's financial market remained segmented until 1886, i.e. as long as an institutional environment persisted that favored local rent seeking. The structural break in Figure 1 can be observed exactly at the time when a new legal framework came into existence that considerably reduced the scope for the self -protection by local vested interests.
A Commercial Code for the Kingdom of Italy came into being in 1865. 38 It was entirely modeled on the Sardinian Code of 1842, 39 which in its turn derived almost verbatim from 36 See also Baia Curioni (1991, 1995) . 37 At the time of political unification, Italy possessed 12,000 kilometers of telegraph lines; there were almost 50,000 a decade later. In 1878 it became mandatory for every municipal-center town to possess a telegraph station. Shortly before the unification, sending a 20-word telegram cost the colossal sum of 20 lira (about 20 times the daily wage for an unskilled male worker). In 1871 the cost of the same telegram was down to 1 lira. 38 Approved by Parliament in 1865, it came into effect on January 1, 1866.
laws of most other Italian states prior to 1861. 41 In the mid-1860s, therefore, the legislation regulating the main aspects of the economic life in the new Kingdom was already half a century old. It thus embodied, alongside novelties introduced by the French Revolution, a number of the Ancien Règime -flavored provisions, which Napoleon's legislators had been either unable or unwilling to subvert. In particular, on both sides of the Alps, the principles of individual freedom, including those concerning the choice and exercise of trades and professions, enshrined in the Code Civil, were somehow mitigated in the Code de Commerce by special norms restricting the entry to a large number of business activities. Professional guilds, as regulated by the Code Savary of 1637, had been legally dissolved, but in the first half of the 19 th century, they were still dying hard.
The Italian Commercial Code was, therefore, more about traders than it was about trade.
As far as the Stock Exchanges were concerned, the 1865 Commercial Code stated that anybody could exercise the profession of financial 'middleman'. It however divided the profession into two groups: 'public middlemen' (pubblici mediatori) and 'simple middlemen' (semplici sensali). While access to the latter status was open to anyone, entry to the profession of 'public middleman' was restricted. Certification was required, obtainable on meeting specific personal conditions 42 and on passing an examination. The law also stipulated that only 'public middlemen' -stock brokers (agenti di borsa) as they were commonly called -were authorized to enter the Stock Exchange floor and conduct business there. Furthermore, only 'public middlemen' were officially allowed to deal in State bonds and to sit in the Bourses' price-fixing committees. The juicy part of the business was thus reserved to a 'closed shop' profession.
39 Substantial changes were only made in the norms regulating bankruptcies, to take into account a Sardinian law of 1838. 40 The French Commercial Code was approved in 1807 and came into effect on January 1, 1808 41 The Commercial Code of the (Napoleonic) Kingdom of Italy, introduced in July 1808, was just a translation of the French Commercial Code, which was also applied to the Kingdom of Naples in 1809. At the time of the Restoration, the Kingdom of Sardinia was the only Italian state to reinstate the old business statutes, whereas Napoleon's Code de Commerce was maintained almost intact not only in the Kingdom of Naples and in the Pope's possessions but (until 1850) in Lombardy and the Venetiae as well, which were under direct Austrian rule. 42 The most important one being the payment of a solvency-guarantee deposit.
While entry-restriction practices by professional bodies alter relative prices in favor of their members, they may do so in a fairly uniform way. Whenever such practices are consistently applied nation-wide, they may not hinder the creation of a 'single market' for the services of the profession itself. This was not the case in Italy during the quartercentury following political unification. Within the wide limits set by the law, individual Stock Exchanges, once chartered by the government, were allowed large degrees of freedom in drafting their own statutes and in conducting their own affaires. In doing so, they drew from the local (pre-unification) business practices. Moreover, the supervision of the Stock Exchanges was to a large degree entrusted to the local Chambers of
Commerce. Needless to say, the stockbrokers were well represented in the governing bodies of such institutions. Training requirements and examinations for the 'publicmiddleman' profession were also regulated locally and the profession itself could only be exercised within the Bourse for which certification was granted.
Given this institutional context, it is hardly surprising that, in the early 1870s, an official inquiry found a wide variety of business practices across the Italian Stock Exchanges.
The huge discrepancies in price listing have already been mentioned. Disparities across markets were also observed in business (opening) hours, in contract settlements, and in price-fixing processes. Whether local norms simply reflected time-honored traditions or were also intended as devices for the protection of local markets, the end result was the same: an increase in the investor's transaction costs of conducting financial dealings outside the local market. However evidence suggests that the latitude of self-governing powers was purposely used to shelter local financial markets from outside competition. 44 Casanova (1984) ; Padoa Schioppa (1984) . 45 Articles 26 and 27. 46 The Chambers of Commerce were still allowed to certify middlemen and stockbrokers, on condition that certification did not "imply a privilege in the exercise of such professions" (Codice di Commercio, Lavori preparatori (1882: vol. I, 146) .
Only when the whole process of institutional overhaul was completed, was the creation of a single market for the Rendita Italiana 5% achieved.
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This institutional interpretation of Italy's financial market unification will not be complete without accounting for two episodes of market de-integration (the upward blips in the coefficient of variation observed in 1866 and 1873-76). The 1866 phenomenon was short-lived and is likely attributable to wartime circumstances. Taking into account that the war of 1866 put the very existence of the new Kingdom in jeopardy, it is easy to see how 'news' may have impacted the various Bourses differently, through the already segmented financial market, thus increasing price dispersion.
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Market de-integration in 1873-76 can be explained by institutional factors. It is likely that initially, the asset price bubble and bust of 1873 increased price dispersion due to differences in short-term risk assessment by agents in different localities within a segmented market. But, in the absence of other circumstances, the episode was bound to be as short-lived as that of 1866. Other circumstances, however, materialized. They took the form of a long dispute between the government and the stockbrokers. In 1874, the government announced a stamp tax on financial transactions 49 that stockbrokers deemed discriminatory. Their highly specious argument was that the tax would not fall on the shoulders of 'simple middlemen' who were conducting off-market transactions, since the middlemen would simply fail to report or underreport their own business. The stockbrokers argued that such an opportunity was not open to them because of their official status and the fact that their business took place under the lime light of the corbeille. They therefore stood to lose customers (on whom the tax would ultimately fall) in favor of 'simple middlemen'. To protest the stamp-tax, stockbrokers increasingly resorted to off-market transactions themselves, to the point that on certain days and markets, price-fixing for the Rendita Italiana turned out to be, in the best cases, based 47 It is likely that a single market for other securities, traded in lower volumes and less frequently, took much longer to emerge. 48 E.g. one can assume that the defeat of the Italians by the Austrians in the north-east appeared to be more threatening to the inhabitants of nearby regions than to those of distant Naples. 49 The tax became effective on January 1 with an obvious impact on across-markets asset price dispersion. The repeal of the stamp tax, in September of that year, 52 and the ensuing end of the stockbrokers' protest, is underlined in Figure 1 by a sharp decline in asset price dispersion.
A transparent metaphor
In the early 1860s the Italian Peninsula, Metternich's mere 'geographical expression', became one of Europe's largest sovereign states. It soon created a customs' and monetary union and promoted market unification by investing in up-to-date networking technology (telegraph and railways). Yet we have shown that it took about a quarter of a century for the law of one price to be realized in the market for state bonds, arguably the one for which the unification process was the easiest and simplest of all, monetary unification and ICT diffusion notwithstanding. We have shown that financial market unification was delayed by an institutional setting that provided ample opportunities for rent seeking by the vested interests entrenched in the local Stock Exchanges and that only the creation of a unified legal framework for security dealings would finally allow for prices of the Rent to convergence across the main Italian Bourses. .0006
.0008 Figure B1 shows that the overall time profile of the coefficient of variation is quite insensitive to the behavior of any single specific market.
